Many developing economies, especially in Latin America, appear to be experiencing structural growth in their informal sectors, inconsistent with traditional views that the informal sector acts as a buffer against unemployment, or is symptomatic of labour market segmentation. This paper presents microeconometric evidence for Brazil that challenges this conventional wisdom. A model of informal sector choice is estimated using selectivity-corrected predicted earnings for each individual in both informal and formal sectors. The results of this show that a higher predicted earnings differential between the informal and formal sector is associated with a greater probability of a worker being employed in the informal sector. We conclude that informal employment may be a desirable form of labour market status for many in Latin America, rather than a consequence of structural segmentation or cyclical displacement.
Introduction
Informal employment, which is outside the protection of any state employment and social protection system, is endemic in many d eveloping and newly industrialising
economies. An established view in the literature is that the informal sector acts as a buffer between formal employment and open unemployment and, consequently, as formal sector jobs are destroyed during restructuring or recession, informal employment rises (Tokman 1992, Portes and Shaunffler 1993) . Another traditional way of looking into the issue of why informal labour markets exist is through considering the hypothesis of labour market segmentation. In the presence of segmentation rewards in the different sectors of the economy differ for workers of equal potential productivity and, in this context, the existence of a dual labour market would be consistent with dualism in earnings as long as workers with similar characteristics are paid different wages according to the sector in which they work (Dickens and Lang 1985) . In both cases, the informal sector represents the disadvantaged sector in a dualistic labour market.
However these traditional views fail to offer much insight into the structural growth in the size of the informal sector. Recent work for a number of developing countries suggests that informal employment may in fact be a desirable choice for workers, because formal sector protection is often inefficient a nd therefore ineffective, and refutes a traditional segmented, non-competing groups understanding of the relationship between the two sectors (Maloney 1999 , Funkhouser 1996 , Marcoullier et al. 1997 , and Saavedra and Chong 1999 .
Assuming a standard neoclassical labour market, earnings and occupational choice would only reflect different amounts of inherited characteristics and of investment in human capital.
Thus, if workers in the informal sector are paid lower wages, this is because they are less educated or less experienced and/or their human capital endowment might have had an influence in their occupational choice, and not because the two sectors present different wage determination processes. In this case, the labour market for relatively unskilled workers may be seen as integrated with the formal sector, offering desirable jobs with distinct characteristics from which workers may choose with little queuing (Maloney 1999 ). This paper uses recent Brazilian micro data to investigate the determinants of the selection of workers into formal or informal employment, and the relative impacts of different labour market factors on earnings in the two states. The aims of the paper are firstly to assess the relative determinants of earnings, especially human capital, in the two sectors; secondly to investigate the scale of sample selection bias on earnings estimates from ignoring the formal/informal distinction; and thirdly to analyse the determinants of informal employment status and in particular the possible influence of relative predicted informal/formal earnings for the individual on this status selection. On this last issue there would appear to be no previous research at the micro-econometric level.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the context for the study, reviewing previous micro and macro empirical work on informal employment. Section 3 discusses the data source used in the present study. Section 4 sets out our econometric methodology. Section 5 presents results for both comparative earnings functions for formal and informal employment and for a selection equation, and provides a decomposition analysis of the difference in the mean earnings of the two groups. Both reduced and structural form estimates of a model of i nformal/formal selection are presented.
Section 6 draws conclusions.
Structural Influences on Informal Employment
Large informal sectors play an increasingly important economic role in many developing economics, albeit one that is difficult to quantify precisely. Estimates for developing countries show that informality can accommodate up to 50% of the economically active population (Funkhouser 1996) . Estimates vary because there is no firm agreement on how to define informal status. Some commentators argue that all self-employed workers should be regarded as in the informal sector, others focus on the numbers who are working but not paying social security contributions and therefore fall outside any systems of employment and social protection. In the Brazilian context a useful indicator of informal employment status is the absence of a signed labour card ("carteira de trabalho assinada"), and this is the empirical definition used in the present paper. The growth in employment of this form has been rapid in Brazil, whilst numbers in formal employment have remained fairly static. From an economically active population of 18 million in 2000, 4.5 million were employed in the informal sector. The relative growth in the informal sector has been rapid from 17% of the economically active population in 1990 to 27% in 2000, and this growth appears to be structural rather than cyclical (Carneiro 1997 ).
There has been little or no formal investigation of the possible explanations for this growth. However the informal sector appears to have a growing depressant influence on formal sector wage determination in Brazil (Carneiro and Henley 1998) . Do workers choose informal employment or are they selected into the informal sector because of the relative abundance of such jobs? Recent work for a number of developing countries suggests that informal employment may in fact be a desirable choice (Maloney 1999 , Marcoullier et al. 1997 . Indeed this is reinforced by Pradhan and van Soest (1997) , also researching in a Latin American context, who find evidence of substantial household labour supply substitution between the two sectors. Low formal sector wages do in fact encourage participation in the informal sector. Fernandes (1996) estimated logit models for Brazil to assess the probability of a worker being employed in the formal sector using household data for 1989 and found that the probability of being formal increases with age, reaches a peak, and then declines. The author also found that the higher the schooling the higher the probability of a worker being in the formal sector. He also showed that the maximum probability of finding a formal job is achieved at the age of 42 and that men are more likely to be in the formal sector. A similar pattern has been found for a group of Central American countries by Funkhouser (1996) and for Peru by Saavedra and Chong (1999) , who both reported a significant negative relationship between level of education and informal employment. This evidence is suggestive that an increase in education is associated with a decrease in the probability of informal employment. Sedlacek et al. (1990) investigated the case of Brazil and reported that unpaid workers move disproportionately into the informal sector, which is suggestive that while in school and just after completing school, many individuals help out at the family business and eventually get paid. They spend on average only two years doing this before moving onto other paid work. Even if this pattern of graduation from school to unpaid work t o informal salaried work to other models of work represents the queuing that the dualistic literature might predict, the time spent in informal salaried work is not very long, being similar to the pattern observed in industrialised countries. Maloney (1999) , for example, reports that median tenure of young workers (16 to 24 years old) in the United States is only 1.4 years and 3.4 years for workers 25 to 34 years old.
As for the earnings differentials, Fernandes (1996) assesses the determinants of the difference in earnings between workers in the formal and the informal sectors. His estimates indicated lower differentials for men relative to women and that the differentials tend to grow with schooling at a rate of 2.7% per additional year of schooling. Earlier evidence confirms that earnings differentials are significant between the formal and informal sectors, ranging from 30% in the early 1980s to 45% in the early 1990s in favour of formal employment (Pero 1992, and Cacciamali and Fernandes 1993) . However these results must treated with considerable caution because of the absence of any correction for sample selectivity bias.
Data Source
The present paper uses data drawn from the 1997 Brazilian household survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios, PNAD). The PNADs are a series of nationally representative household surveys conducted more or less annually since 1976, using a consistent methodology by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estastistica (IBGE).
All members of each household over ten years in age are asked detailed questions concerning their labour market activity during (in the 1997 case) the week 21 st to 27 th September. The 1997 PNAD surveyed a total of 109,541 households, comprising 121,078 economically active individuals between the ages of 18 and 65. Of the 73,896 private sector employees who gave information on whether they had a signed labour card or not, 39.9% were working without one. It seems likely that this proportion is an understatement, given that some respondents did not know whether they had a labour card or were reluctant to reveal that they did not have one. Figure 1 plots the log earnings distribution for both groups -with and without signed labour cards. Although mean log earnings for informal workers are lower, dispersion of earnings in the two groups is similar. Returning to Table 1 we see that the two groups have similar average ages and tenure. However, informal workers are less likely to have achieved secondary or higher level education, and are much more likely to be illiterate. Informal workers are somewhat more likely to be male and to be non-white.
One of the most pronounced differences between the two groups is to be found in the proportions employed in establishments with more than 10 employees. Informal workers are less than a third as likely to be working in larger establishments. There are also some substantial and important differences between the groups in terms of their means of payment.
While salaried (waged) employment is the dominant form of payment for both groups (92% of formal workers, 76% of informal workers), informal workers are six times more likely to be paid on commission or according to amount produced, and over 20 times more likely to be paid on piece rates. In fact piece rate payment for formal workers is extremely rare. On average other household earnings between the two groups are different. Formal sector workers benefit from R$88 more per month income in the household (that is labour income from other household members, or other non-labour income). Although the proportions of the sample with multiple jobs are low (below 4%), informal workers are somewhat more likely to hold more than one job. The model proceeds from the assumption that an individual will be allocated to formal employment if the utility derived from that allocation exceeds the alternative available from informal employment. We assume that the difference in utility from the two sectors is a linear 1 The sample is further reduced to 62,528 by the absence of data on other covariates, including earnings, used in the empirical analysis. 2 Where an individual reports multiple jobs, the data in the analysis refer to the main job (as defined by the respondent). 3 This methodology is developed by Lee (1978) in the context of the union participation decision, and has been adopted, for example, for self-employment choice by Rees and Shah (1986) function of the difference in (log) earnings ( Y) and a vector of individual characteristics (X).
Thus the probability that the difference between utility from self-employment and from employment being greater than zero is:
where . We assume that earnings are determined according to semi-log earnings functions as follows:
and (3) where Z are covariate vectors, δ are coefficient vectors, and e are random errors distributed N(0, σ I2 ) and N(0, σ F2 ) respectively. The model is identified by the exclusion from Z of
elements of X. It is well known under the circumstances presented here that estimation of (2) and (3) by OLS will be inconsistent. Consistent estimates can be obtained by estimating, as a probit, a reduced form of equation (1): (4) These estimates are used to construct a selectivity correction term (inverse Mills ratio) that is incorporated into the earnings functions as follows: (5) and (6) where λ are coefficients and φ and Φ are the density and cumulative distribution functions of a standard normal variable respectively. Given this structure we would expect λ I > 0 and λ F < 0 if workers in each sector enjoyed a comparative earnings advantage in the sector t o which they have been selected. Equations (5) and (6) multiple job holding. In most cases these variables are strongly statistically significant in the selection equation. We will turn to detailed discussion of the influences on informal/formal selection when we discuss our structural equation estimates shortly.
Results
Turning to the results for the earnings equations, we obtain a better overall equation fit for the formal workers sample than for the informal sample. We find significant linear age effects for both groups of a similar order of magnitude. The coefficients for the higher spline segments points to only limited evidence for non-linearity in the age-earning profile for either group 5 . Earnings for both groups appear to be decreasing in tenure and with some significant higher spline coefficients 6 .
Schooling coefficients are relative to a base of adult education, such as adult literacy and other skills classes. Education to merely elementary or primary level without further adult education appears to disadvantage workers. College and postgraduate education provides a substantial earnings advantage for both groups but more so in the formal sector.
Being female has a relatively bigger impact on earnings for formal workers ( -31%) than for informal workers ( -26%). However, the relative premium for being white is the nearly the same in both groups (11-13%). The union differential is significant for both groups but much larger for formal workers at just over 16% compared to 7% for informal workers.
Finally urban formal workers do relatively better than their informal counterparts, in comparison to workers in rural areas.
The "lambda" coefficient in the earnings equations reports the estimate for selectivity correction term in equations (5) and (6). In both cases it is statistically significant and positively signed. This is consistent with an informal worker enjoying a significant comparative earnings advantage over a formal sector worker, given a particular set of other modelled characteristics, but not the reverse. The results are therefore consistent with informal sector choice being rational. The "rho" coefficient reports the degree of correlation between the error terms in the selection equation and the relevant earnings equation. It is higher for informal workers.
From the estimated earnings equations in Table 2 we are able to generate predicted earnings in each state for each sample individual, 7 in order to construct a predicted wage differential. This is then included in the structural probit, and the results for this are presented in Table 3 . The coefficient on the predicted wage differential attracts a positive and strongly significant coefficient, implying, as would be expected, that the larger the difference between available earnings in the informal and formal sectors the more likely a n individual is to be working in the informal sector. A 1 per cent increase in the ratio of the predicted informal wage to the predicted formal wage raises the probability that an individual is working in the informal sector by 0.22 percentage points.
The results also show that female, white, unionised, urban workers, workers in large As in the reduced form results payment method has a statistically significant, quantitatively large impact on the probability of informal status in the structural model. Being paid by commission or output raises the probability of being informal by 44 percentage points, and by piece rate by 54 percentage points. Having more than one job raises the probability of informal status in the main job by a statistically significant 8.7 percentage points. Finally an extra R$1000 per month of other household income raises the probability of having informal status by a statistically significant 1 percentage point. This last result is perhaps surprising given that additional income from other sources in the household might reduce the marginal utility of the opportunity cost of paying social insurance contributions.
7 A correction factor equal to 0.5ó 2 j where j = I, F as appropriate is added to predicted However it may simply indicate that a worker feels better protected against income risk if there is other household income and the need for social and employment protection is attenuated.
The structural probit regression reported in Table 3 also included industry and occupational dummy variables. These are jointly statistically significant and many of the individual coefficients, especially for occupation, are individually statistically significant. The largest positive q uantitative impacts on the probability of informal status arise in construction and service industries and in service occupations. A number of occupations are associated with significantly reduced probability of informal status, particularly administrative occupations, but also manufacturing, retailing, and transport and communications occupations. Table 4 reports a decomposition analysis of the difference in mean formal and informal earnings for the estimates reported in Table 2 , using the method described by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) . The decomposition avoids the usual index number problem with earnings decompositions by constructing a vector of implied weighted average coefficients to represent the returns to particular characteristics that might hold in a unified competitive labour market. The decomposition takes the following form:
where
. (5) and (6).The symbol "^" denotes an estimated coefficient vector. The left-hand side of (7) earnings in each state to allow for the fact that the earnings function has semi-log form.
measures the selectivity-corrected difference in the mean log earnings of the two groups. The first term of the right-hand side captures that part of the difference explained by differences in average characteristics of the two groups. The second term captures that part of the difference due to differences in the returns to particular characteristics enjoyed by each group. The first part of this term captures the advantage of being in the formal sector (over the notional "competitive" rates of return) and the second part the disadvantage to being in the informal sector. As the table shows, at the mean log earnings difference after correction for selectivity is 0.72. Of this difference 46 per cent can be explained by lower average levels of remunerated characteristics in the informal sector of which age, tenure and occupation contribute the largest shares (10, 12 and 19 per cent respectively), with unionisation, region and education also contributing shares of between 6 and 8 per cent. The lesser importance of education appears to contrast with the previous research reviewed above. Lower rates of remuneration to particular characteristics in the informal sector explains 24 per cent of the overall difference, and high rates in the formal sector a further 13 per cent.
Conclusions and Assessment
This paper has presented micro-econometric estimates of the determinants of earnings and selection between informal and formal status, accounting for the simultaneous determination of the two, using recent Brazilian data. Our results show that formal/informal sample selection bias is quantitatively important in modelling earnings and has a statistically significant impact on earnings for both groups. Informal workers appear to enjoy comparative earnings advantage in their selected sector, consistent with selection into the informal sector being a rational choice. This conclusion is reinforced in our structural model of the selection decision where the earnings differential between informal and formal workers has a strong, statistically significant effect on the probability of working in the informal sector. A 1 per cent increase in the differential raises the probability of informal status by 0.22 percentage points. To this extent our results support the recent conclusion of Marcoullier et al. (1997) , Saavedra and Chong (1999) and Maloney (1999) that informal employment may be a desirable form of labour market status for workers in Latin American economies, rather than informal employment arising from structural segmentation of the labour market into two noncompeting groups. Our results also show that 63 per cent of the difference in average earnings between the two sectors can be explained by differences in characteristics, with the remaining 37 per cent being explained by lower levels of return to particular characteristics being paid in the informal sector.
As to the explanations for the trend growth in the size of the informal sector in Brazil, our approach suggests that comparative cross-sectional research, modelling selection at different points in time, particularly both before and after the Brazilian trade liberalisation of the early 1990s, will be a fruitful avenue for future work. For the moment our results suggest that some of the strongest influences might arise from industrial restructuring away from manufacturing towards services, from changes in unionisation, and from changes in methods of payment from traditional waged employment towards pay related to worker performance or productivity. Recent proposals in Brazil to reduce the burden of social security deductions on formal sector workers will, according to our results, have a quantitative impact on reducing the size of the informal sector by reducing its relative attractiveness in terms of expected earnings. Notes: All equations also include 2 -digit industry dummies (9), 2 -digit occupation dummies (7) and regional dummies (4). * denotes coefficient significant at 10%, ** at 5%. (30) 62528 -29065.9 22320.0** Notes: Equation also includes 2 -digit industry dummies (9) and 2 -digit occupation dummies (7). Marginal effects show the effect of a discrete change in the case of dummy variables. * denotes coefficient significant at 10%, ** at 5%. .15
